Painting the World Green: The Need for Financial Institutions to Leverage Equator Principles and Sustained Green Financing to Ensure Corporate Environmental Responsibility

This essay was adjudged as the third best entry in the Second NLUJ CSBF Essay Writing Competition, 2020-21. The article was submitted by Sushant Khalkho. The author is student at National Law School of India University, Bangalore.

Abstract:
The last decade has witnessed polarizing debates on climate change, global food security, and the role of State and private economic actors in addressing the same. With the post-COVID world economy restarting its engines, commercial borrowing of capital from financial institutions for project financing shall become more commonplace. Striking a delicate equilibrium between environmental rights and business needs, national interests and international obligations, is a crucial need of the times. The first section provides a broad overview of green finance and thereby tries to locate the imperative for green finance in Indian corporate environmental responsibility jurisprudence as developed by the executive fiat and judicial precedents. The second section draws a comprehensive overview of contemporary legal, regulatory, institutional, and technical developments in green finance sector through the illustrative inter-jurisdictional case studies of India, United Kingdom and China, for cataloguing and adopting global best practices. The third section broadly discusses the equator principles and their applicability to India alongside the environmental impact assessment notification 2020 in context of green financing. The fourth section evaluates the environmental impact assessment Notification 2020 on the normative crucible of the latest equator principles through a doctrinal desk review. The fifth section builds upon the preceding sections to provide viable suggestions for India to gainfully navigating the way forward. In the aforementioned ways, the chapter bridges the gaps in contemporary scholarship on the subject of green financing, equator principles, environmental impact assessment notification 2020 and corporate environmental responsibility.

Introduction

With COVID lockdowns inadvertently causing a steep, short-term plunge in global greenhouse gas emissions[i] and improvement in air quality,[ii] there is an exigent need hereon forth, to realize that the extant status quo cannot continue as is. As the world economy gradually picks up steam, a post-COVID world needs to leverage this moment to facilitate transition of the economy towards more a sustainable and green future. This is where green financing and its various instrumentalities come into the picture. For lack of a concrete definition, the term ‘green finance and investment’[iii] refers to diverse financial services and products, provided by financial institutions (‘FIs’) for sustainable development.[iv] Green finance pathways can broadly categorized into three heads namely, project finance, ethical-green investment, and environmental reporting.[v]

Locating the Green Finance Imperative in Indian Corporate Environmental Responsibility Jurisprudence

The above discussion on green finance assumes significance when placed in the context of corporate environmental responsibility (‘CER’) in the 21st century. India should be cognizant that that the 21st century has the dubious distinction of being called the ‘age of neo-liberalism’.[vi] The leading questions of this century[vii] are to do with outlining the proper role and responsibilities of Multi National Corporations (‘MNEs’)[viii] in addressing broader stakeholder concerns[ix] vis-a-vis duty towards its shareholder.[x]

This discussion on corporate social and environmental responsibility assumed real world importance for India during MC Mehta v Union of India,[xi]and Bhopal gastragedy.[xii] CER in India mingled with the Gandhian idea of business as ‘trusteeship’,[xiii] calling for adoption of pro-social goals along with wealth creation.[xiv] This was a step ahead from transactional understanding of merely assigning corporate obligations for preventing, mitigating and compensating society for adverse effects of business externalities.

A. Executive Response to Corporate Environmental Responsibility

Thus, the Ministry of Environment and Forests (earlier ‘MoEF’ but now ‘MoEFCC’) through its notifications, guidelines and circulars used to ensure CER compliance. Starting with Corporate Responsibility for Environmental Protection (‘CREP’) in 2003, India began regulating the most polluting industries in India[xv] through prescribed regulatory compliance standards and voluntary management standard.        

Moreover, India batted for adoption of environment-friendly technology through the CSR Voluntary Guidelines (2009).[xvi] The Ministry also directed all Central Government PSU’s to adopt Corporate Environment Policy in 2011. The memorandum also allocated responsibility at each level of management to ensure compliance.[xvii] Again, the National Voluntary Guidelines on Environmentally Responsible Business in 2011[xviii] recognized the need for accountability and mitigation of direct as well as indirect environmental damage by corporations.         

The year 2013 was another milestone in the Indian and global CSR landscape. India took the proactive step of legislating CER into its legal fabrics via s 135 of the Companies Act 2013 (India).[xix] s 135 read with sch VII mandates spending a fixed percentage of profits for environmental sustainability activities.[xx] However, it was reported that constant violations of corex provisions for s 135 lead to non-compliance being the rule rather than the exception.[xxi] What is even more discouraging is that recent scholarship points to intentional avoidance by corporate and misuse of corex provisions.[xxii] In 2020, s 21 of the Companies (Amendment) Act 2019,[xxiii] which sought to penalize violations of CSR provisions with criminal sanctions on corporate executives along with onerous fines, was left un-notified[xxiv] under pressure from India Inc.[xxv]

B. Judicial Response to Corporate Environmental Responsibility

However, it the judiciary has played an essential role in developing CER jurisprudence since independence. From MC Mehta[xxvi] wherein the ‘principle of absolute liability’ was mooted, to ICELA v Union of India,[xxvii] which established ‘polluter pay principle’, to the relatively recent MC doctrine of public trust brought into the Indian environmental imagination through Mehta v Kamalnath.[xxviii]

While on one side the executive were implementing CER through administrative fiat, on the other, Indian Courts were developing domestic CER jurisprudence by holding corporate entities accountable through corporate criminal liability. Numerous cases in India established the jurisprudence on ‘piercing the corporate veil’ and a corporation’s ‘directing mind’.[xxix]

C. Iron Law of Business Responsibility and the Calabresi-Melamed Framework for Settling Entitlements

Now an analysis of s 135 reveals that mere fines for violation of CSR provisions, only enforces the ‘liability rule’ to ‘entitlements’ under the 2013 Act.[xxx] The ‘entitlement(s)’ to a company can be understood from the perspective of the ‘iron law of business responsibility’ (hereinafter ‘ILR’) which states that, in the long run, those who do not use power in a manner which society considers responsible will tend to lose it’.[xxxi] The reasoning of the ILR holds that a business institution, as a legal entity, receives a bundle of rights from the society it is allowed to operate in. This bundle of rights is established and protected by law and is called an ‘entitlement’.[xxxii]

One of these entitlements is the right of a corporation to exist and operate in that society. Furthermore, this entitlement is allowed to subsist with the corporation or is amended or revoked, based on the factum of whether the business continues to adhere to the social responsibility requirements, demanded of it, by society.[xxxiii] In short, according to ILR, for business in the 21st century to operate in any society, the business has to use operate in society in a socially responsible way. If it doesn’t, then the corporation runs the risk of losing their entitlement to operate in that society.[xxxiv]

Inter-jurisdictional Comparative of Global Best Practices in Green Finance Sector

A. India: Miles to go Before we Sleep

At present, a preliminary overview of contemporary national and international developments on this front is encouraging. In 2020, India became the second-largest market globally for ‘green bonds’[xxxv] after China,[xxxvi] and is ranked eighth as an emerging market for green bonds issuance.[xxxvii] Furthermore, the use of environmental friendly equity index such as BSE-GREENEX,[xxxviii] and NSE’s participation in Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative[xxxix] among others are salubrious developments. Other green financing pathways can be through Green Investment Banks[xl] (such as Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency), green building and vehicle finance,[xli] blended financing,[xlii] etc. However, what is undeniable is that India needs to pace itself to meet its development needs.[xliii]

B.   United Kingdom: Rising Force in Green Finance

Enthusiasm for green financing is observable in the UK. As one author notes, green financing is central to the post-COVID ‘broader strategy to rebuild the UK economy … with a greater focus on sustainability’.[xliv] The UK government has established a Green Finance Taskforce for recommending delivery of investments to achieve carbon budget and environmental goals.[xlv] Furthermore, UK’s sovereign green bonds issuance is slated for 2021 and the UK is actively making green loans for facilitating SME’s more readily available.[xlvi] The UK is also set to become the first country to make Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (‘TCFD’) like financial, corporate governance and stewardship disclosures mandatory by all listed companies and large asset owners in 2023.[xlvii]

C.  China: Vanguard of Green Finance Sector

China’s is a vanguard in green finance sector[xlviii] and its green credit policies uniformly apply to all commercial lending.[xlix] Over the past decade, China has introduced several green credit reforms which direct banks to undertake environmental due diligence and require banks to monitor clients’ (even prospective clients’) environmental risk. In 2012, China became the first country to adopt comprehensive Green Credit Guidelines, developed in consultation with the IFC.[l] These guidelines most importantly, prohibit issuance of credit to clients who do not comply with environmental and social performance regulations, as per art 17 of guidelines. Art 18 directs banks to use contractual covenants to require clients to make representations and warranties regarding their environmental and social risk management.[li]

The period from 2014 onwards saw the second phase of green finance framework, which saw China establishing green financial system (inclusive of green bond market, green development funds, etc). China rolled out the Green Credit Implementation Key Audit Standards (2014) with over 80 detailed indicators assessing bank’s measures in: setting green credit targets, overseeing green credit implementation, how bank assesses its client’s compliance pre and post-issuance, report loan volume borrowed by borrowers breaching compliance, reporting ‘black credit’ loan volume to firms in 19 sectors with either high pollution, overcapacity, or high resource consumption, etc.[lii] However, a lacunae in implementation is that majority of Chinese banks do not have professional staff working on environmental issues, unlike most Western banks.[liii]

The aforementioned inter-jurisdictional comparatives are illustrative of the fact that India has some catching up to do in the green finance space. Thereby, a burning need of the times is for public and private financial institutions to catalyze and mobilize institutionally held capital, for investment financing into low-carbon and carbon-resilient (‘LCR’) infrastructure, in earnest. This is especially true in case of developing nation-states where much of this infrastructure is likely to be built. It goes without saying that national, regional and international financial institutions have to seriously reorient their investment preference,[liv] to the greatest extent feasible regardless of their varying individual risk appetites, liability profiles, and other constraints and concerns like country’s sovereign risk, policy settings, institutions and investment climate.

Voluntary Framework of Equator Principles and its Applicability to the Indian Landscape

This is an appropriate segue into the crux of the essay. This section along with the next, evaluates the Environmental Impact Assessment Notification 2020 (‘EIA 2020’) on the normative crucible of the latest equator principles (‘EP4’), through a doctrinal desk review. In doing so, the essay contends with the role of traditional providers of private investment funding (primarily the banking sector) in the context of CER and green financing.

A.           EP4 – Altering Transnational Governance in Project Finance Sector

The Equator Principles are voluntary, baseline, globally-recognized, practical, risk management guidelines[lv] to be incorporated into loan documents[lvi] for project financing transactions.[lvii] They are binding on financial institutions (usually banking and lending institutions) that adopt them and a project has to comply with all 10 principles to qualify for funding.[lviii] These financial institutions are called Equator Principles Financial Institutions (‘EPFI’). The latest version of EP (i.e., EP4) came into full effect on October of 2020.[lix] Therefore, EP4 enables FIs to commit to responsible investment[lx] (including green financing) by enabling financial institutions to conduct social and environmental due diligence of concerned projects or companies, before issuing credit.[lxi] This ensures that project(s) which are financed: (i) have lower risk of environmental law violations, and (ii) enhance the quality of the underlying assets for banks (iii) insure financial institutions against reputational risks associated with environmental law violations.[lxii]

EP4 categorizes nation-states into ‘designated countries’ and ‘undesignated countries’.[lxiii] As per EP4, India is presently an undesignated country which means that India does not have ‘robust environmental and social governance, legislation systems and institutional capacity designed to protect their people and the natural environment’.[lxiv] Projects financed by EPFIs have to comply with differing environmental and social assessment standards, depending on whether the project is situated in a designated or non-designated country.[lxv] Now, while the RBI in 2019 concluded that ‘Banks in India have been sensitized to the various international initiatives including the Equator principles’.[lxvi]

However, this does not seem to convey the actual ground reality. Out of 111 EPFIs,[lxvii] since June 2013, IDFC is the first and only financial institution to sign up for EP.[lxviii] As one author observed, ‘Global banks are not matching promises to address climate change by altering the way they do business, despite many signing up to influential initiatives promoting transparency and green finance’.[lxix] This statement is buttressed by incidents such as the recent demonstration by activists against SBI’s grant of a $1 billion loan to Adani’s Carmichael operations in Australia.[lxx] Thus there seems to be a deep disjunction between the projected image and ground reality w.r.t. adherence to EP.

B.            Contemporary Developments in EIA 2020

The advent of the controversial EIA 2020 in March 2020 in the thick of the COVID pandemic[lxxi] led to calls for its revision to ensure India’s green recovery. Most immediate concern was the go-ahead given to more and more mega-construction, highway, mining and industrial projects[lxxii] such as Coal India Limited’s mining of Assam’s Dehing Patkai Elephant Reserve,[lxxiii] a train line through Telangana’s, or the expanded plan for a highway via Goa’s Mollem wildlife sanctuary.[lxxiv] It is ironic that such executive action followed close on the heels of India’s low rank of 177 from among 180 nations-states, in the most recent Environment Performance Index.[lxxv]

Evaluating Environmental Impact Notification 2020 on the Normative Crucible of Equator Principles

The following subs-ss shall demonstrate the disjunction between the policy and practical positions taken by EP4 and EIA 2020. Through the comparison, the aim is to highlight global best practices to illuminate pathways for reform of Financial Institutes in the Indian context. The discussion has been trifurcated as below:

A.           Blurred Lines: Of Categorization and Compliance    

In EIA 2020, dozens of category A projects have been moved to B1 or B2 category which require more lenient EIA compliance with lesser oversight.[lxxvi] B2 industries don’t need public consultation or EAC reports at all.[lxxvii] This is in contradiction to EP4 Principle 1 which classifies projects into 3 categorizations of A (significant adverse irreversible risk projects), B (limited adverse reversible risk projects) and C (minimal adverse risk projects) based on the IFC nomenclature. Herein, it is important to note that EP4[lxxviii] as well as IFC’s Performance Standards (‘IFC PS’) requires international financial institutions to comply with all relevant host country environmental and social laws, regulations and permits as well as all IFC PS.[lxxix]

Furthermore, the IFC PS accounts for deviations in compliance standards between the IFC PS vis-à-vis laws prevalent in host country. In case of differing compliance standards, the IFC and EP4 require the EPFI to adopt and apply the ‘more stringent levels or measures’.[lxxx] Therefore, it goes without saying that the assessment of credit risks process to designate categorization should be in adherence to good international industry practice.[lxxxi] Generally, the category B projects that are deemed to be riskier are allowed to be deemed as category A projects on the EPFI’s discretion.[lxxxii]           

Thus, the EIA 2020 classifies project categories in a subjective manner.[lxxxiii] It should have been on the basis of their social or environmental impact but at present EIA classifies them on capacity and size of the project. Capacity and size and impact are not always correlated. Thus, many-a-industries can now be given the go-ahead for commencing operations as close as 0-5 kms from a protected area on the Central Government’s discretion. Unless a scientifically determined appropriate distancing of such projects takes place, the present EIA 2020 position has potential to compromise the unique founa and flaura as well as water sources.EP4 Principle 2 read with Exhibit II[lxxxiv] address this as they requires Category A (and, where appropriate Category B Projects), to undertake an assessment, which includes an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (‘ESIA’) or specialized studies of: (i) environmental and social risks and (ii) scale of impacts of the proposed project.

B.            Whither Stakeholder Engagement?

First, the EIA 2020 dilutes the public hearing process by exempting[lxxxv] numerous large-scale industrial projects in B2 category.[lxxxvi] This is a far cry from the earlier regime wherein public hearing was conducted by executive magistrate at the site or close proximity in every district in the manner prescribed. What this simply means now is that the public and stakeholders won’t be privy to proper information. Moreover, several category A projects such as (but not limited to): (a) offshore projects located beyond 12 nautical miles (onshore or offshore oil), (b) chemical manufacturing and petroleum products, (c) national highways expansion, (d) renewable energy projects like dams (e) buildings, construction and area development, among others,[lxxxvii] have been excluded  from  public consultation and prior expert approval.[lxxxviii]           

Second, the ‘stakeholder engagement’ envisioned under EIA 2020 is at odds with EP4 Principle 5. EP4 require all category A and B projects to engage in ‘effective’ stakeholder engagement with affected (read: vulnerable, disadvantaged, and more importantly indigenous peoples, etc) groups, environment and other stakeholders.[lxxxix] The EP4 calls for ‘informed consultation and participation processes’ commensurate with the project’s risks and impacts.[xc] Again, IFC’s PS 7 details the requirements of ‘free, prior and informed consent’ (‘FPIC’) of affected Indigenous people.[xci]

It requires clients to document ‘(i) the mutually accepted process between the client and Affected Communities of Indigenous Peoples, and (ii) evidence of agreement between the parties as the outcome of the negotiations’.[xcii] While the IFC guidance note 7, noted that FPIC was towards achieving ‘[comprise] a process and an outcome’, with the outcome being ‘an agreement’.[xciii] Interestingly, Principle 5 also envisions project assessments on a continuous, ‘ongoing basis’.[xciv] There is also academic literature that buttresses the observation that lax pre-consultative processes make for weak ease of doing business rankings.[xcv]

As of now, the EIA 2020 does little to address these concerns on the pathway shown by EP4. EIA 2020 has furthermore whittled down public consultation process to be completed in forty days from the earlier forty-five days. It also reduced the notice period for public hearing down to twenty days from the earlier thirty days.[xcvi] This shorter timelines for public consultation and hearing goes against established practices and raises concerns of exclusion of people and areas not well-connected in India. Such a step also goes against Indian judicial precedents which have held inadequate consultation timelines to be a violation of Principles of Natural Justice.[xcvii] The case of Centre for Social Justice v Union of India[xcviii] is illustrative. Herein, the Gujarat High Court stated that date of first public hearing needs to be after a minimum of thirty days after notice publication.

Again, in Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd v Ministry of Environment and Forest,[xcix] the Supreme Court ruled that the concerned Gram Sabha would have to be consulted before environmental clearance of development projects (in this case it was bauxite mines) before MOEF grants approvals in scheduled areas.[c] Also, in Le Farge case, the apex court in its guidelines held that ‘public consultation or public hearing … is a mandatory requirement of the environment clearance process’.[ci] And in Samarth Trust v Union of India (2010), the Delhi High Court equated public hearing with ‘Participatory justice in the nature of Jan Sunwai, where the community is the jury’.[cii]

However, the most contentious issue in EIA 2020 was the option for industries and projects to get post-facto environmental approval.[ciii] Simple fines for late approval of projects undertaken in absentia of prior-EC or prior-EP are too little and too less and may open the floodgates for a fait accompli like situation. Herein, once project has commenced, no option may remain but for grant of clearance despite significant violations.[civ] For example, at present a ground levelling operation can be undertaken without prior-approval, but such an operation in hilly regions may prove to wreck devastation on run-off water.[cv]

Post-facto approvals have been questioned by the Indian Supreme Court in Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Rohit Prajapati & Ors.[cvi] Here the apex court held that post-facto approvals were ‘unjust’ and that the concept of retrospective environmental clearance goes against Indian environmental jurisprudence.[cvii] A very recent example of the problems with post-facto clearance is the case of LG Polymers (India) (P) Ltd v State of Andhra Pradesh.[cviii] Here the industry was found to be operating without environmental clearance.[cix] Therefore, there is strict need to incorporate the ‘prior’ component of FPIC in EIA 2020.

C.            Robust Reporting Mechanisms

Under the erstwhile EIA Notification 2006, industries were required to submit biannual compliance reports,[cx] however under EIA 2020 industries only need submit can one compliance report.[cxi] The EP4 Principle 10 requires the client to ‘report publicly, on an annual basis’, while EPFIs are to report transactions publicly ‘at least annually’.[cxii] EIA 2006 is stricter standard that should be followed, as one year is too long a reporting timeframe to detect and reverse damages, if any. Additionally, it is advised that such declarations be made in the form of a sworn affidavit[cxiii] to prevent dilution of intended environmental, health or social standards. To realize independent environmental and social consultation on ‘an ongoing basis’,[cxiv] EP4 Principle 5 must be read with Principle 10.[cxv]      

The intent of these EP4 principles can be read from the preamble which seeks to assess the potential and actual risks during the lifecycle of the project’s development.[cxvi] Since India has increased the validity of environmental clearances for specific industries like mining projects[cxvii] (from fifty to thirty years), and river valley projects (increased from ten to fifteen years),[cxviii] such long reporting timeframes may lead to harmful effects remaining unnoticed for long durations. The EP4 Principles 2 and 3 requiring ‘ESIA’ for category A and B projects are one way to prevent this.[cxix]

Suggestion(s) and Conclusion

Therefore, is safe to state that EP4 in expanding the standards, procedures, and measures of social and environmental due diligence according to the scale of the project, offers ample opportunities for fruition of green finance initiatives through EP4 guided lending decisions. However, India seems to be going backwards by relaxing requirements for environmental and project finance compliances.

The way forward for India is two-fold. First, is the dawning of a realization by Indian FIs that just because they can undertake potentially harmful and adverse projects in India or abroad, doesn’t mean they should do it. The present times are crucial more than ever for Indian FI’s to adopt EP4 in line with the needs of CER and green finance. A good example of corporations taking their environmental responsibility seriously is the sustainability policy of Infosys.[cxx]

Again, there is a growing need for harmonizing India’s international environmental obligations with domestic realities. As we know, India is a dualist polity and treaties or obligations executed by India don’t take effect unless there are legislations made domestically [See Jolly George Verghese v Bank of Cochin[cxxi]and Civil Rights Vigilance Committee v Union of India[cxxii]]. At some point the Indian judiciary may find the ball in their courts to resolve such dilemmas. Like numerous other judgments before, where the Supreme Court of India has legislated global best practices into domestic legal frameworks such as ‘parens patriae’ jurisdiction for person with disabilities in Suchita Srivastava & Anr v Chandigarh Administration[cxxiii], or the euthanasia guidelines  in Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v Union of India,[cxxiv] or even the sexual harassment guidelines post-Vishakha.[cxxv] This would help India’s to stand true to its international environmental obligations among the comity of nations. For the time being adherence to EP4 is needed to facilitate Indian green financed-infrastructure development imperative.


[i] Corinne Le Quéré and others, ‘Temporary Reduction in Daily Global CO2 Emissions during the COVID-19 Forced Confinement’ (2020) 10 Nature Climate Change 647 <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-0797-x</a> accessed 21 March 2021; Chris Mooney, Brady Dennis and John Muyskens, ‘Global Emissions Plunged an Unprecedented 17 Percent during the Coronavirus Pandemic’ (Washington Post, 19 May 2020) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2020/05/19/greenhouse-emissions-coronavirus/> accessed 18 March 2021; Jonathan Watts, “Could Covid Lockdown Have Helped Save the Planet?’ (The Guardian, 29 December 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/29/could-covid-lockdown-have-helped-save-the-planet> accessed 18 March 2021.

[ii] Dieter Helm, “The Environmental Impacts of the Coronavirus” (2020) 76 Environmental and Resource Economics 21 <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10640-020-00426-z</a> accessed 21 March 2021.

[iii] Michael Gerrard and others, ‘Green Finance: Leveraging Investment for Environmental Protection’ (2018) 48(5) Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 10367, 10367.

[iv] Yunwen Bal, Michael Faure, and Jing Liu, ‘The Role of China’s Banking Sector in Providing Green Finance’ (2014) 24(1) Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 89, 95.

[v] Oren Perez, ‘The New Universe of Green Finance: From Self-Regulation to Multi-Polar Governance’ in Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg and Gerd Winter (eds), Responsible Business Self-Governance and Law in Transnational Economic Transactions (Hart Publishing 2008) 152 <https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/responsible-business-self-governance-and-law-in-transnational-economic-transactions/ch6-the-new-universe-of-green-finance-from-self-regulation-to-multi-polar-governance> accessed 19 March 2021.

[vi] Peter Bloom, The Ethics of Neoliberalism: The Business of Making Capitalism Moral (Routledge: NY and London 2017) Preface.

[vii] For a succinct summary of the key contentions of Berle-Dodd debates see AA Sommer Junior, ‘Whom should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later’ (1991) 16(1) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 33, 33-38 <https://www.djcl.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Whom-SHOULD-THE-CORPORATION-SERVE-THE-BERLE-DODD-DEBATE-REVISITED-SIXTY-YEARS-LATER.pdf> accessed  17 March 2021.

[viii] Donald Siegel and Abagail McWilliams, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory of the Firm Perspective’ (2001) 26(1) Academy of Management Review 117, 117 and 118.

[ix] Donald Siegel and Abagail McWilliams, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory of the Firm Perspective’ (2001) 26(1) Academy of Management Review 117, 117 and 118. Also see EM Dodd Junior, ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45(7) Harvard Law Review 1145.

[x] For reference see Adolf Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44(7) Harvard Law Review 1049.

[xi] (1986) 2 SCC 176, AIR 1987 SC 965, MANU/SC/0291/1986.

[xii] Union Carbide Corporation v UoI, 1989 SCC (2) 540, 1990 AIR 273.

[xiii] Jaydeep Balakrishanan, Ayesha Malhotra, and Loren Falkenberg, Multilevel Corporate Responsibility: Comparison of Gandhi’s Trusteeship with Stakeholder and Stewardship Frameworks (2015) Journal of Business Ethics 1, 8 <https://prism.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/handle/1880/50493/Gandhi%20final%20manuscript%20June%202015.pdf;jsessionid=7F6B0D2EDC707EFCF3E6383F85F10B87?sequence=1> accessed 16 March 2021.

[xiv] Bimal Arora and Ravi Puranik, ‘A Review of Corporate Social Responsibility inIndia’ (2004) 47(3) Development 93, 96.

[xv] Central Pollution Control Board-MoEF, Corporate Responsibility for Environmental Protection (2003) <https://www.indiansugar.com/PDFS/CREP-2003-FullText.pdf> accessed 17 March 2021; Radhika Krishnan, ‘CREP: A Review’(Down to Earth, 7 June 2015) <https://www.downtoearth.org.in/blog/environment/crep-a-review-9538#:~:text=In%202003%2C%20the%20Union%20ministry,polluting%20industrial%20sectors%20in%20India.>  accessed 12 November 2020.

[xvi] CSR Voluntary Guidelines (2009) <https://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/CSR_Voluntary_Guidelines_24dec2009.pdf> accessed 17 March 2021.

[xvii] MoEF, Office Memorandum: Corporate Environment Responsibility (2011), Point (B) <http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/corporate-env-res.pdf> accessed 17 March 2021.

[xviii] National Voluntary Guidelines on Social, Environmental and Economic Responsibilities of Business (2011) <https://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/National_Voluntary_Guidelines_2011_12jul2011.pdf> accessed 17 March 2021.

[xix] Ministry of Corporate Affairs-Government of India, Companies Act 2013 (‘2013 Act’), s 135.

[xx] Act 2013, sch VII(iv).

[xxi] ‘Most Indian Companies do not Comply with CSR Norms’ (Times of India, 14 Dec 2018) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/most-indian-companies-do-not-comply-with-csr-norms-isb/articleshow/67082998.cms> accessed 15 March 2021.

[xxii] Akanksha Jumde and Jean du Plessis, ‘Legislated Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in India: The Law and Practicalities of its Compliance’ (2020) 20(20) Statute Law Review 1, 10-19 <https://academic.oup.com/slr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/slr/hmaa004/5841990> accessed 15 March 2021.

[xxiii] Ministry of Law and Justice (Legislative Department–Government of India), Companies (Amendment) Act 2019 (No. 41, New Delhi Wednesday 31 July 2019) <https://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/AMENDMENTACT_01082019.pdf> accessed 15 March 2021 (‘CSR Act 2019’).

[xxiv] KR Srivats, Ministry Keeps new CSR Amendments on Hold’ The Hindu Business Line (New Delhi, 18 August 2019) <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/policy/ministry-keeps-new-csr-amendments-in-abeyance/article29127073.ece> accessed 15 March 2021.

[xxv] Pushpa Sundar, ‘Penalising Companies for CSR Non-Compliance is like Killing a Fly with a Sledgehammer’ (The Wire, 5 August 2019) <https://thewire.in/business/csr-non-compliance-companies-act> accessed 15 March 2021.

[xxvi] (1986) 2 SCC 176, AIR 1987 SC 965, MANU/SC/0291/1986.

[xxvii] ICELA v Union of India, (1996) 3 SCC 212, AIR 1996 SC 1446, MANU/SC/1112/1996.

[xxviii] MC Mehta v Kamalnath, (1997) 1 SCC 388, MANU/SC/1007/1997.

[xxix] Cases such as Standard Chartered Bank v Directorate of Enforcement, (2006) 4 SCC 278, AIR 2006 SC 1301, MANU/SC/8069/2006; Delhi Development Authority v Skipper Construction, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 160, MANU/SC/1005/1995, among many others went to imputing criminal intent to the very management of the company.

[xxx] Guido Calabresi and Douglas A Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85(6) Harvard Law Review 1089, 1092 <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3043&context=fss_papers> accessed 15 March 2021.

[xxxi] Keith Davis and Robert L Blomstrom, Business, Society and Environment: Social Power and Social Response (2nd edn, New York: McGraw Hill 1971) 95 as in Keith Davis, ‘The Case for and against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities’ (1973) 16(2) The Academy of Management Journal 312, 314.

[xxxii] Calabresi and Melamed (n 13) 1089.

[xxxiii] MM Rahim, ‘Raising Corporate Social Responsibility -The Legitimacy Approach’ (2012) 9 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 102, 109.

[xxxiv] K Davis and R Blomstrom, Business, Society and Environment: Social Power and Social Response (2nd edn, McGrawhill: NY 1971) 95.

[xxxv] ‘Green Finance in India: Progress and Challenges’ (2021) Jan 2021 Reserve Bank of India – RBI Bulletin 61, 67 <https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=20022> accessed 20 March 2021; Also generally see Mobilising Bond Markets for a Low-Carbon Transition (OECD Publishing 2017) 13, 13-16 <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/mobilising-bond-markets-for-a-low-carbon-transition_9789264272323-en> accessed 20 March 2021.

[xxxvi] Anshul Joshi, ‘India Becomes Second-Largest Market for Green Bonds with $10.3 Billion Transactions’ (ET Energyworld.com, 3 February 2020) <https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/renewable/india-becomes-second-largest-market-for-green-bonds-with-10-3-billion-transactions/73898149> accessed March 21, 2021.

[xxxvii] ‘Green Bonds and Greener Environment: Are They Linked?’ (DownToEarth.org.in, 2014) <https://www.downtoearth.org.in/blog/environment/green-bonds-and-greener-environment-are-they-linked–75796> accessed 20 March 2021.

[xxxviii] BSE-GREENEX Index Factsheet (2012) <https://www.bseindia.com/downloads/about/abindices/file/BSE-GREENEX%20Factsheet.pdf> accessed 20 March 2021.

[xxxix] ‘NSE Joins Sustainable Stock Exchange Initiative’ (TENNEWS.in, 6 March 2017) <https://tennews.in/nse-joins-sustainable-stock-exchange-initiative/> accessed 20 March 2021.

[xl] Green Investment Banks: Scaling up Private Investment in Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Infrastructure (OECD Publishing 2016) 18-24 <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/green-investment-banks_9789264245129-en> accessed 20 March 2021.

[xli] Shreyans Jain, ‘Financing India’s Green Transition’ (ORF Blog, 27 January 2020) <https://www.orfonline.org/research/financing-indias-green-transition-60753/> accessed 20 March 2021.

[xlii] “Policy Perspectives on ‘Blended Finance: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development and Climate Action in Developing Countries’” (OECD Publishing, 2017) 19 <www.oecd.org/cgfi/forum/Blended-finance-Policy-Perspectives.pdf> accessed 20 March 2021.

[xliii] Mayank Aggarwal, ‘India Needs Massive Increase in Green Finance for Required Climate Action’ (Mongabay-India, 24 September 2020) <https://india.mongabay.com/2020/09/india-needs-massive-increase-in-green-finance-for-required-climate-action/> accessed 21 March 2021.

[xliv] Imogen Garner and Daniel Nevzat, ‘The Future of UK Green Finance Policy and Implications for the Banking Sector’ (2021) 36(2) Journal of International Banking & Financial Law 131, 131.

[xlv] Green Finance Taskforce, Accelerating Green Finance (E3G, 1 March 2018) 7 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/703816/green-finance-taskforce-accelerating-green-finance-report.pdf> accessed 14 March 2021.

[xlvi] Joywin Mathew, ‘Shades of Green in Financing: a Discussion on Green Bonds and Green Loans’ (2018) 33(5) Journal of International Banking & Financial Law 311, 313.

[xlvii] Imogen Garner and Daniel Nevzat, ‘The Future of UK Green Finance Policy and Implications for the Banking Sector’ (2021) 36(2) Journal of International Banking & Financial Law 131, 131.

[xlviii] Min Yan, ‘Government and Regulation in Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility – The Case of China’ (2020) 33(2) Columbia Journal of Asian Law 264, 281.

[xlix] Virginia Harper Ho, ‘Sustainable Finance & China’s Green Credit Reforms: A Test Case for Bank Monitoring of Environmental Risk’ 51(3) Cornell International Law Journal 609, 610.

[l] Yunwen Bal, Michael Faure, and Jing Liu, ‘The Role of China’s Banking Sector in Providing Green Finance’ (2014) 24(1) Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 89, 106; Also see Virginia Harper Ho, ‘Sustainable Finance & China’s Green Credit Reforms: A Test Case for Bank Monitoring of Environmental Risk’ 51(3) Cornell International Law Journal 609, 631.

[li] Virginia Harper Ho, ‘Sustainable Finance & China’s Green Credit Reforms: A Test Case for Bank Monitoring of Environmental Risk’ 51(3) Cornell International Law Journal 609, 632.

[lii] Virginia Harper Ho, ‘Sustainable Finance & China’s Green Credit Reforms: A Test Case for Bank Monitoring of Environmental Risk’ 51(3) Cornell International Law Journal 609, 634.

[liii] Kevin P Gallagher and Fei Yuan, ‘Standardizing Sustainable Development: A Comparison of Development Banks in the Americas’ The Journal of Environment & Development 26(3) (2017) 243, 263.

[liv] Michael Gerrard and Charles E Di Leva and John Rousakis and Douglass Sims, ‘Green Finance: Leveraging Investment for Environmental Protection’ (2018) 48(5) Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 10367, 10369.

[lv] Equator Principles Association, ‘The Equator Principles’ <https://equator-principles.com./about/.> accessed 14 March 2021.

[lvi] Larry Cata Backer, ‘The Corporate Social Responsibilities of Financial Institutions for the Conduct of Their Borrowers: The View from International Law and Standards’ (2017) 21(4) Lewis & Clark Law Review 881, 907.

[lvii] Larry Cata Backer, ‘The Corporate Social Responsibilities of Financial Institutions for the Conduct of Their Borrowers: The View from International Law and Standards’ (2017) 21(4) Lewis & Clark Law Review 881, 907.

[lviii] Yolandi Meyer, ‘The Effectiveness of Market-Based Initiatives for Regulating Development Projects by Multinational Corporations in African with Regard to Human Rights and Environmental Abuses’ (2019) 19(1) African Human Rights Law Journal, 126, 143.

[lix] ‘1 October Marks Effective Date For EP4’ (Equator Principles, 1 October 2020) <https://equator-principles.com/ep-association-news/1-october-marks-effective-date-for-ep4/> accessed 19 November 2020.

[lx] Rita Motaa, ‘Banks as Human Rights Enforcers? A Comparative Analysis of Soft Law Instruments’ (2018) 34(2) American University International Law Review 351, 368 <https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1976&context=auilr> accessed 14 March 2021.

[lxi] Priya Garg, “Presenting a Critique of Green Financing in India” (IndiaCorpLaw, 13 May 2018) <https://indiacorplaw.in/2018/05/presenting-critique-green-financing-india.html> accessed 14 March 2021.

[lxii] ibid.

[lxiii] Equator Principles Association, ‘Designated Countries’ <https://equator-principles.com/designated-countries/> accessed 14 March 2021.

[lxiv] Equator Principles EP4 (Equator Principles Association, July 2020) 24 and 28 <https://equator-principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/The-Equator-Principles-July-2020.pdf> accessed 19 March 2021.

[lxv] Equator Principles EP4 (Equator Principles Association, July 2020) 10 <https://equator-principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/The-Equator-Principles-July-2020.pdf> accessed 19 March 2021.

[lxvi] “Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2018-19” (Reserve Bank of India-Jayant Printery LLP 2019) 18 <https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/0RTP241219FL760D9F69321B47988DE44D68D9217A7E.PDF> accessed 18 March 2021.

[lxvii] Kate E Morrow, ‘Development Disasters: Accountability and Remedy in International Development Projects’ (2020) 70 American University International Law Review 725, 733 <http://www.aulawreview.org/development-disasters-accountability-and-remedy-in-international-development-projects/> accessed 18 March 2021.

[lxviii] Equator Principles Association, ‘Reporting – IDFC FIRST Bank Ltd (2018-2019)’ <https://equator-principles.com/reporting-idfc-first-bank-ltd-2018-2019/> accessed 14 March 2021; FPJ Bureau, ‘IDFC Becomes the First Indian Financial Institution to Join the Equator Principles Association’ (Free Press Journal, 12 June 2013) <https://www.freepressjournal.in/business-wire-india-section/idfc-becomes-the-first-indian-financial-institution-to-join-the-equator-principles-association&gt; accessed 14 March 2021.

[lxix] Jennifer Thompson, ‘Banks Fail to Stop Financing Fossil Fuel Industry’ (Financial Times, 9 November 2019) <https://www.ft.com/content/39122b04-bcb4-4c3d-9240-cdbf145594d6> accessed 20 March 2021.

[lxx] ‘The $1 Billion Adani-SBI Loan’ (Finshots, 30 November 2020) <https://finshots.in/archive/adani-sbi-1-billion-dollar-loan/> accessed 14 March 2021.

[lxxi] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Environment Impact Assessment Notification (2020) (‘EIA 2020’) <http://moef.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Draft_EIA2020.pdf> accessed 14 March 2021.

[lxxii] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (Wildlife Division), Minutes of 57th Meeting of the Standing Committee of National Board for Wild Life- reg. (F.No.6-2/2020 WL, 20 April 2020) <http://forestsclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/Order_and_Release/41120122312171Minutesof57thMeetingoftheStandingCommitteeofNationalBoardforWildLifeheldon07.04.2020.pdf> accessed 12 March 2021.

[lxxiii] Jayashree Nandi, ‘Large parts of Assam’s Elephant Reserve mined without wildlife nod’ Hindustan Times (New Delhi, 18 July 2020) <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/large-parts-of-assam-s-elephant-reserve-mined-without-wildlife-nod/story-NFh0yNncJ3PiUePrlUGJ7J.html#:~:text=Coal%20India%20Limited%20(CIL)%20had,Wildlife%20(NBWL)%20have%20revealed.&text=%E2%80%9CYes%2C%20they%20(CIL),more%20areas%20than%20earlier%20known.>  accessed 12 March 2021; ‘Environmentalists Opposed Coal Mining in Saleki of Dehing Patkai Elephant Reserve’ (Assam Sentinel, 18 May 2020) <https://www.sentinelassam.com/topheadlines/environmentalists-opposed-coal-mining-in-saleki-of-dehing-patkai-elephant-reserve-477385> accessed 12 March 2021.

[lxxiv] V Nilesh, ‘National Wildlife Board Nod for Rail Line in Telangana’s Kawal Tiger Corridor’ The New Indian Express (Hyderabad, 10 April 2020) <https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/telangana/2020/apr/10/national-wildlife-board-nod-for-rail-line-in-telanganas-kawal-tiger-corridor-2128165.html> accessed 12 March 2021.

[lxxv] Centre for Science and Environment, ‘Press Releases: India at the bottom of 2018 Global Environmental Performance Index (EPI) rankings: says Yale University study analysed by CSE’ (New Delhi, 5 June 2018) <https://www.cseindia.org/india-at-the-bottom-of-2018-global-environmental-performance-index-epi-rankings-says-yale-university-study-analysed-by-cse-8780> accessed 12 March 2021.

[lxxvi] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, EIA Notification 2020, Schedule <http://environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/Draft_EIA_2020.pdf> accessed 16 March 2021.

[lxxvii] ‘Environmental Impact Assessment Draft Notification, 2020 – Can the EIA Law in India Broaden its Horizon?’ (CEERA-NLSIU, Bengaluru 2020) 3 <http://nlspub.ac.in/environmental-impact-assessment-draft-notification-2020-can-the-eia-law-in-india-broaden-its-horizon/> accessed 16 March 2021.

[lxxviii] Equator Principles Association, The Equator Principles 4 (4 July 2020) Principle 8 <https://equator-principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/The-Equator-Principles-July-2020-v2.pdf> accessed 14 March 2021.

[lxxix] International Finance Corporation, Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts (1 January 2012), (ii) ¶ 5 <https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/8804e6fb-bd51-4822-92cf-3dfd8221be28/PS1_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=jiVQIfe> accessed 16 March 2021.

[lxxx] International Finance Corporation, Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts (1 January 2012), (ii) ¶ 7 <https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/8804e6fb-bd51-4822-92cf-3dfd8221be28/PS1_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=jiVQIfe> accessed 16 March 2021.

[lxxxi] World Bank Group, Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines (World Bank, 30 April 2007) <https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-at-ifc/policies-standards/ehs-guidelines> accessed 14 March 2021.

[lxxxii] Equator Principles Association, The Equator Principles 4 (4 July 2020) 9 <https://equator-principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/The-Equator-Principles-July-2020-v2.pdf> accessed 14 March 2021.

[lxxxiii] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, EIA Notification 2020, sch <http://environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/Draft_EIA_2020.pdf> accessed 14 March 2021.

[lxxxiv] Equator Principles Association, The Equator Principles 4 (4 July 2020) Principle 2 read with Exhibit II <https://equator-principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/The-Equator-Principles-July-2020-v2.pdf> accessed 14 March 2021.

[lxxxv] ‘Environmental Impact Assessment Draft Notification, 2020 – Can the EIA Law in India Broaden its Horizon?’ (CEERA-NLSIU, Bengaluru 2020) 4 <http://nlspub.ac.in/environmental-impact-assessment-draft-notification-2020-can-the-eia-law-in-india-broaden-its-horizon/> accessed 16 March 2021.

[lxxxvi] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, EIA Notification 2020, s 14 <http://environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/Draft_EIA_2020.pdf> accessed 17 March 2021.

[lxxxvii] Web Desk, ‘Explained: What is EIA 2020? How does it Water Down the Existing Policy? Many Activists have called the New EIA “Anti-environment” and “Pro-industries”’ (The Week, 10 August 2020) <https://www.theweek.in/news/biz-tech/2020/08/10/explained-what-is-eia-2020-how-does-it-water-down-the-existing-policy.html> accessed 17 March 2021.

[lxxxviii] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, EIA Notification 2020, s 5 <http://environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/Draft_EIA_2020.pdf> accessed 16 March 2021.

[lxxxix] Equator Principles Association, The Equator Principles 4 (4 July 2020) <https://equator-principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/The-Equator-Principles-July-2020-v2.pdf> accessed 14 March 2021.

[xc] International Finance Corporation, Performance Standard 1 Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts (1 January 2012) ¶¶ 30-32 <https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/8804e6fb-bd51-4822-92cf-3dfd8221be28/PS1_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=jiVQIfe> accessed 14 March 2021.

[xci] Nathan Yaffe, Indigenous Consent: A Self-Determination Perspective (2018) 19(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 703, 712 and 713.

[xcii] Read International Finance Corporation, Performance Standard 7 Indigenous Peoples (1 January 2012) ¶ 12 <https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/3274df05-7597-4cd3-83d9-2aca293e69ab/PS7_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=jiVQI.D> accessed 14 March 2021,

[xciii] International Finance Corporation, Guidance Note 7 Indigenous Peoples (1 January 2012) ¶ 25 <https://equator-principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Evaluating_Projects_with_Affected_Indigenous_People_Ext_Sept_2020.pdf> accessed 14 March 2021.

[xciv] International Finance Corporation, Performance Standard 1 Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts (1 January 2012) ¶ 36 <https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/8804e6fb-bd51-4822-92cf-3dfd8221be28/PS1_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=jiVQIfe> accessed 11 March 2021.

[xcv] Bhuvana Anand, Ritika Shah, and Jayana Bedi, ‘How does India Fare on Regulatory Hygiene? Status Check of the Rule-Making Process’ (2020) 8 Journal of Indian Law and Society 69, 71 <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hK3Hm7q3j7DhtcqoGsmXayzQ_3EN90Md/view> accessed 11 March 2021.

[xcvi] ‘Environmental Impact Assessment Draft Notification, 2020 – Can the EIA Law in India Broaden its Horizon?’ (CEERA-NLSIU, Bengaluru 2020) 3 <http://nlspub.ac.in/environmental-impact-assessment-draft-notification-2020-can-the-eia-law-in-india-broaden-its-horizon/> accessed 16 March 2021;  Also, Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, EIA Notification 2020, s 18(3) read with procedure of public consultation 7.1(iii) <http://environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/Draft_EIA_2020.pdf> accessed 11 March 2021.

[xcvii] Stellina Jolly, ‘Draft EIA Notification 2020 is out of Sync with State Practices, International Law’ (The Wire: Science, 31 July 2020) <https://thewire.in/environment/draft-environment-impact-assessment-notification-international-law> accessed 11 March 2021.

[xcviii] AIR 2001 Guj 71, (2000) 3 GLR 1997, MANU/GJ/0162/2000, ¶[17(iii)].

[xcix] (2013) 6 SCC 476, MANU/SC/0396/2013, refer to ¶¶[60] and [61] <http://nlsenlaw.org/forest/domestic-legal-framework-2-2/supreme-court-cases/orissa-mining-corporation-ltd-vs-ministry-of-environment-and-forest-and-ors/> accessed 11 March 2021.

[c] Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd v Ministry of Environment and Forest, (2013) 6 SCC 476, MANU/SC/0396/2013, ¶¶[60] and [61]. 

[ci] TN Godavarman Thirumulpad v Union of India (2011), Guideline (xiv) <http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/Lafarge.pdf> accessed 11 March 2021.

[cii] Samarth Trust v Union of India, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 2127, MANU/DE/1129/2010 at ¶[17].

[ciii] Jay Mazoomdaar, ‘Explained: Reading the draft Environment Impact Assessment norms, and finding the red flags’ The Indian Express (New Delhi, 10 August 2020) <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/draft-environment-impact-assessment-norms-explained-6482324/> accessed 11 March 2021; See Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, EIA Notification 2020, s 20 <http://environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/Draft_EIA_2020.pdf> accessed 11 March 2021.

[civ] ‘Environmental Impact Assessment Draft Notification, 2020 – Can the EIA Law in India Broaden its Horizon?’ (CEERA-NLSIU, Bengaluru 2020) 24 <http://nlspub.ac.in/environmental-impact-assessment-draft-notification-2020-can-the-eia-law-in-india-broaden-its-horizon/> accessed 16 March 2021.

[cv] G Ananthakrishnan, ‘The Hindu Explains | What are the Key Changes in the Environment Impact Assessment Notification 2020?’ (The Hindu, 2 August 2020) <https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/the-hindu-explains-what-are-the-key-changes-in-the-environment-impact-assessment-notification-2020/article32249807.ece> accessed 11 March 2021.

[cvi] 2020 SCC OnLine SC 347 <https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2016/2562/2562_2016_0_1501_21582_Judgement_01-Apr-2020.pdf> accessed 11 March 2021.

[cvii] 2020 SCC OnLine Jhar 796.

[cviii] (2020) 6 SCC 622, 2020 SCC Online SC 488.

[cix] MR Subramani, “Vizag Gas Leak: LG Polymers India Operated Plant ‘Illegally’ As It Did Not Have ‘Valid Environmental Clearance’” (Swarajya, 12 May 2020) <https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/vizag-gas-leak-lg-polymers-india-operated-plant-illegally-as-it-did-not-have-valid-environmental-clearance#:~:text=The%20Visakhapatnam%20plant%20of%20LG,leak%20which%20claimed%20many%20lives.> accessed 11 March 2021.

[cx] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, EIA Notification 2006, s 10(2) <http://www.environmentwb.gov.in/pdf/EIA%20Notification,%202006.pdf> accessed 11 March 2021.

[cxi] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, EIA Notification 2020, s 20(4) <http://environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/Draft_EIA_2020.pdf> accessed 11 March 2021.

[cxii] Equator Principles Association, The Equator Principles 10 (4 July 2020) <https://equator-principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/The-Equator-Principles-July-2020-v2.pdf>  accessed 14 March 2021.

[cxiii] ‘Environmental Impact Assessment Draft Notification, 2020 – Can the EIA Law in India Broaden its Horizon?’ (CEERA-NLSIU, Bengaluru 2020) 7 <http://nlspub.ac.in/environmental-impact-assessment-draft-notification-2020-can-the-eia-law-in-india-broaden-its-horizon/> accessed 16 March 2021.

[cxiv] Equator Principles Association, The Equator Principles 4 (4 July 2020), principles 5 read with 10 <https://equator-principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/The-Equator-Principles-July-2020-v2.pdf> accessed 11 March 2021.

[cxv] Equator Principles Association, The Equator Principles 4 (4 July 2020), principles 5 read with 10 <https://equator-principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/The-Equator-Principles-July-2020-v2.pdf> accessed 11 March 2021.

[cxvi] Equator Principles Association, The Equator Principles 4 (4 July 2020), preamble <https://equator-principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/The-Equator-Principles-July-2020-v2.pdf> accessed 11 March 2021.

[cxvii] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, EIA Notification 2020, s 19(1)(d) <http://environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/Draft_EIA_2020.pdf> accessed 19 March 2021.

[cxviii] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, EIA Notification 2020, s 19(1)(e) <http://environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/Draft_EIA_2020.pdf> accessed 19 March 2021.

[cxix] Equator Principles Association, The Equator Principles 4 (4 July 2020) 2 <https://equator-principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/The-Equator-Principles-July-2020-v2.pdf> accessed 19 March 2021; Also see International Finance Corporation, Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts (1 January 2012), (ii) ¶ 5 <https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/8804e6fb-bd51-4822-92cf-3dfd8221be28/PS1_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=jiVQIfe> accessed 19 March 2021.

[cxx] Infosys, Infosys Sustainability Policy (2010) <https://www.infosys.com/sustainability/Documents/infosys-sustainability-policy.pdf> accessed 17 March 2021.

[cxxi] (1980) 2 SCC 360, AIR 1980 SC 470, MANU/SC/0014/1980 at ¶[11].

[cxxii] AIR 1983 Kant 85 at ¶[18].

[cxxiii] (2009) 9 SCC 1.

[cxxiv] Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 454.

[cxxv] Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241, AIR 1997 SC 3011.

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